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To cite this article: Carol A. Bormann PhD & Michael H. Stone PhD (2001) The Effects of Eliminating Alcohol in a College Stadium: The Folsom Field Beer Ban, *Journal of American College Health*, 50:2, 81-88, DOI: [10.1080/07448480109596011](https://doi.org/10.1080/07448480109596011)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07448480109596011>



Published online: 24 Mar 2010.



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The Effects of Eliminating Alcohol in a College Stadium: The Folsom Field Beer Ban

Carol A. Bormann, PhD; Michael H. Stone, PhD

Abstract. In fall 1996, the University of Colorado at Boulder instituted a ban on beer sales at football games. To evaluate the effects of the ban, the authors collected two types of data: first, they examined the effects of the ban on game-day security incidents; second, they looked at survey data from season ticket holders and students. They administered the surveys after the first two postban seasons to assess ticket holders' attitudes about the new policy. The incident data they found indicated dramatic decreases in arrests, assaults, ejections from the stadium, and student referrals to the judicial affairs office following the ban. Survey data also indicated moderately negative attitudes about the ban among students and some season ticket holders. However, all fans were likely to renew their tickets regardless of their attitudes toward the policy. The study illustrates what can be achieved when alcohol is eliminated from a setting that frequently fosters disorderly and aggressive behaviors.

Key Words: alcohol use, athletics, binge drinking, college students, sports stadium

The consequences of binge drinking (also referred to as *heavy, episodic drinking*¹) on college campuses have been widely recognized as a national problem.²⁻⁶ For example, Douglas et al⁴ found that 34% of university undergraduate respondents reported consuming five or more alcoholic drinks on at least one occasion in the preceding 30 days. Forty-two percent of college students surveyed between 1995 and 1996 as part of the Core survey had binged in the 2 weeks before completing the survey.³

The Core Survey results are consistent with the last two national administrations of the College Alcohol Study (CAS) conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health,^{5,7} in which Wechsler and associates reported that from 43% to

44% of college students they surveyed engaged in heavy, episodic drinking at least once in the 2 weeks before responding to the study.^{5,7}

Furthermore, nearly half (47%) of the students in the 1999 Wechsler survey indicated that getting drunk was an important motivator for their drinking behavior.⁷ More than one quarter (27%) forgot where they were or what they had done as a result of their drinking at least once since the beginning of the school year. Twenty-one percent had engaged in unplanned sex, and 12% had been hurt or injured because of their alcohol consumption.

The University of Colorado (CU) at Boulder is no exception to other institutions in terms of drinking. Wechsler's CAS surveys conducted in 1993, 1997, 1998, and 1999 showed that slightly more than half of CU-Boulder undergraduates engaged in binge drinking. These rates are higher than national averages, compared with all colleges surveyed and with a subset that included only public universities enrolling 10,000 or more students.

Researchers have found consistent evidence that heavy drinkers are a threat to campus safety, which is reflected in higher rates of assaults, vandalism, and getting into trouble with police.^{1,3,7,8} In addition to threatening others' safety, heavy drinkers are at higher risks for causing harm to themselves, including engaging in unplanned or unprotected sex, getting hurt or injured, and requiring medical treatment for excessive alcohol consumption.^{3,7,8} As a result, heavy drinking is no longer dismissed as harmless partying, and universities are increasingly viewing excess alcohol consumption as a safety issue.⁹

Wagenaar and Perry¹⁰ point out that environmental factors, such as availability of alcohol, serve as a major determinant of how much young people will drink and the negative outcomes of their drinking. Similarly, Chaloupka and Wechsler¹¹ demonstrated that higher drinking rates among

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college students can be directly linked to the availability of and ease of access to alcohol. Thus, college administrators nationally are recognizing a need to address factors in the campus environment that promote high-risk drinking.

CU Boulder has been part of this growing national trend. One place where CU administrators are trying to curtail hazardous drinking on campus is Folsom Field, the football stadium. Before 1996, CU Boulder was the only school in the Big 12 to sell alcohol in the stadium. The effects of selling alcohol in the stadium during games were evident in the many game-day incidents by students and nonstudents alike. For example, in the 1995 season alone, university police recorded 121 ejections, 20 arrests, and 9 assaults at the six home games held in Folsom Field.

Beginning with the fall 1996 season, the college administration enacted a 2-year moratorium on beer sales in the stadium as an experiment to assess the effect on incident rates of a no-alcohol policy. The move was quite controversial: public health and safety officials praised it, but some student and alumni groups criticized it.

During the 2-year moratorium, we reviewed police incident data to determine whether the ban was having the desired effect of increasing safety at the games. We also surveyed holders of season tickets and university students, the people most affected by the ban, to assess their attitudes about the ban and about game-day experiences in general.

Because college stadiums where alcohol sales are allowed are so rare, the ban at Folsom Field provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of prohibiting alcohol sales in a major college stadium. Our review of the literature revealed only one other study that examined the effects of a changed alcohol policy in a large sports stadium. Spaite et al¹² studied the effects of a policy to prevent fans from bringing alcohol into the University of Arizona football stadium, where alcohol sales had never been permitted, in 1985.

Spaite and associates reviewed medical incident reports from 1983 to 1986 to track game-day injuries and illnesses. They found no measurable effect on the overall incidence of medical problems that could be attributed to the new policy but did observe some alterations in the patterns of injuries and illnesses. Their investigation did not include an evaluation of changes in rates of rejection or arrests.

In this article, we evaluate the effect of halting alcohol sales in a major university sports stadium. We present game-day incident data from before and after the ban and data from a survey of season ticket holders and students.

METHOD

Game-Day Incident Data

Six home games are played at Folsom Field each fall football season. The CU-Boulder Police Department collected crime statistics for incidents in Folsom Field for the 1995 through 1999 football seasons. The data include reports of ejections from the stadium, student referrals to the campus judicial affairs office, arrests, assaults, and numbers of individuals transported to the local detoxification facility.

Survey Administration

After the 1996 and 1997 football seasons, the Office of Planning, Budget, and Analysis surveyed CU-Boulder students and season ticket holders who renewed or did not renew their tickets for the coming year to determine

- (a) satisfaction with the alcohol ban
- (b) the effect of the ban on crowd behavior
- (c) the effect of the ban on level of enjoyment at the games
- (d) other aspects of the game-day experience, and
- (e) the effects on renewals of season tickets.

1996 Season Ticket Holder Survey

About 11,000 individuals held season tickets during fall 1996. When the Athletic Department mailed ticket renewal notices in April and May 1997, it included a questionnaire in approximately every tenth envelope, providing a random sample of renewing season ticket holders. Four-hundred eight (41%) of the 995 surveys mailed were returned; only 227 fall 1996 season ticket holders (2%) did not renew their tickets for 1997, a typical nonrenewal rate. Of surveys sent to all nonrenewers, 79 (35%) were returned. Because surveys to season ticket holders were sent anonymously, we were unable to follow up with nonrespondents.

1996 Student Survey

Fourteen thousand seats in Folsom Field are reserved for CU-Boulder students. To reach student ticket holders, we selected a random sample of 516 students from the university student population (approximately 25,000, including undergraduate and graduate students). To expedite the ticket distribution process, the ticket office does not record any identifying information for students who purchase tickets. Therefore, names of student ticket holders from which to select the sample were unavailable. We had to rely on a random sample of the general student body to identify those who attended games. Students were assured of confidentiality of their data, but their responses were not anonymous.

We oversampled new students (ie, those entering in fall 1996) to determine whether their attitudes toward the ban were different from those of students who had attended the university in years when alcohol was still sold. Thus, approximately half of the sample consisted of students who entered CU-Boulder before the ban was instituted in fall 1996, and about half were new students in fall 1996, the first year of the ban. We sent e-mail surveys to the sample of students in April 1997 and sent a follow-up e-mail survey to nonrespondents approximately 2 weeks later. A 1997 survey of students showed that more than 85% had *and* used e-mail. Thirty-one percent (160) of the students responded to the Folsom Field survey. Of those responding, 72% (115) had attended a game in fall 1996. Only 4 surveys were returned as undeliverable.

1997 Season Ticket Holder Survey

For the 1997 season ticket holder survey, we sent questionnaires to a random sample of 500. Because we did not find significant differences in attitudes between renewing and nonrenewing season ticket holders in the 1996 survey, we did not attempt to identify nonrenewers separately from renewers. In addition, we were interested in surveying season ticket holders as close to the end of the season as possible, and renewal status was not known until late April. We mailed the surveys in early February 1998; 261 of the group (52%) responded. Of these, only 15 indicated that they did not intend to renew their season tickets for the following season.

1997 Student Survey

We sent e-mail surveys to a random sample of 498 students enrolled at CU-Boulder in spring 1998. Of the 26% (131) who responded, 58% had attended a game in fall 1997.

Questionnaire

Season ticket holders and students received nearly identical questionnaires, but we did not ask students about satisfaction with parking at games. Also, because the e-mail survey to students was not anonymous, we did not include demographic items.

Five items assessed attitudes regarding the no-alcohol policy, including satisfaction, effects on crowd behavior, changes in levels of enjoyment at the game, and support for the policy. We included nine additional items to assess satisfaction with other aspects of the game-day experience. Results for only two of these items—satisfaction with security at the games and satisfaction with crowd behavior—are reported here as relevant to the beer ban.

The questionnaire that we sent to 1996 nonrenewing season ticket holders also contained a section assessing reasons for nonrenewal. Recipients were to select from a list of nine reasons why they had chosen not to renew their tickets. They could check more than one reason, could write in a reason that was not included on the list, and were asked to indicate the "biggest reason" why they chose not to renew their season tickets.

The questionnaires we used in the 1996 and 1997 surveys were nearly identical. The most substantial change in 1997 was that we asked all season ticket holders whether they intended to renew their tickets for the 1998 season. We asked those who did not intend to renew to indicate why they planned not to do so.

University staff in the institutional analysis office, assisted by personnel from several student affairs offices on campus, developed the questionnaire. Before the questionnaires were administered, campus and city police, several students, and the university chancellor reviewed them for content and clarity, but no other efforts were made to validate the questionnaires. Because responding to the questionnaire was completely voluntary and responses were to be used only for administrative purposes, the survey was exempt from Institutional Review Board review.

Data Analysis

We analyzed game-day incident data by comparing the number of actual incidents over the years with the distribution of incidents that would be expected if the ban had no effect, calculating chi-squares to determine statistical significance. We also used contingency coefficients to judge the size of the ban effect. In cases in which chi-square analysis resulted in minimum expected cell frequencies under five (ie, assaults and detox transports), we conducted Fisher exact tests by collapsing over postban years. To assess differences between season ticket holders and students' attitudes within years and changes over time within each group, we analyzed survey data using *t* tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and present effect sizes.

TABLE 1
Demographic Data for Students and Season Ticket Holders, Folsom Field 1996 and 1997

Variable	1996 (%)	1997 (%)
<i>Students</i>		
Gender		
Male	50	54
Entry term		
After ban	57	55
Resident	66	58
Class level		
1st	33	16
2nd	21	28
3rd	17	22
4th	14	25
Graduate/professional	15	9
<i>Season ticket holders</i>		
Gender		
Male	77	77
Age (y)		
≤ 40	29	20
41–50	26	27
51–60	21	26
≥ 61	23	26
Years holder		
≤ 2	5	3
3–5	11	11
6–9	23	21
≥ 10	60	64
Affiliation		
Faculty	4	4
Student	3	1
Parent	12	15
Staff	6	8
Alumni	48	51
Big money donor	2	4
Unaffiliated	37	30

Note. No missing data for students, 1996, *n* = 115, 1997, *n* = 76. Season ticket holders, some missing data, 1996 (*N* = 487) row *n* = 470–482; 1997 (*N* = 261) row *n* = 253–261.

TABLE 2
Total Number of Folsom Field Game-Day Incidents,
by Year and Incident Category

Incident category	Beer-sale ban					χ^2	Contingency coefficient
	None	2-year		Permanent			
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999 ^b		
Ejections ^a	121	61	57	68	58	(4, 365) = 41**	.318
Arrests	20	11	5	6	6	(4, 48) = 16**	.500
Assaults	9	1	0	1	0	(4, 11) = 27** ^c	.840
Detox transports	7	4	4	3	3	(4, 21) = 3 NS ^c	.354
Student referrals to CU judicial affairs	58	11	9	24	16	(4, 118) = 68**	.605

^aIn 1997, CU-Boulder instituted a new policy of ejecting persons caught passing student IDs to nonstudents to gain admission to the stadium. Ejection figures for all years shown here do not include ejections for passing an ID; therefore, the data are comparable across years.

^bIncludes only five home games; one game was played off-site at Mile High Stadium in Denver. All comparisons between 1995 and 1998, except detox transports, were also significant.

^cBecause of the minimum expected cell frequencies under 5, Fisher exact tests were also conducted for assaults and detox transports by collapsing across postban years. The test was significant for assaults ($p < .001$), but not for detox transports, which is consistent with the χ^2 results in Table 2. NS = not significant.

** $p < .01$.

RESULTS

Demographics

The data in Table 1 show demographic information for season ticket holders and students. The season ticket holders were similar across the 2 years; however, a comparison of students across the 2 years revealed one difference. For the 1996 survey, we had purposefully oversampled first-year students to allow for comparisons between those who had attended CU-Boulder when beer was still sold in Folsom Field (ie, before 1996) compared with newly admitted students, who would have had no experience with the stadium. In 1997, we made no attempt to compare students in this way; the proportion of 1997 freshman respondents is therefore much smaller than that in 1996. Because we found no differences by entry year, the change in class level composition in the 1997 survey was not expected to influence results for 1997.

Security Incidents

The security data provide evidence of the affect of the new alcohol policy in Folsom Field. See Table 2 for incident data for five seasons: one season prior to the ban (1995), two seasons when the 2-year moratorium was in place (1996 and 1997), and two seasons after the university chancellor made the ban permanent (1998, 1999).

When we compared the first season the ban was in place with the year before the ban, we found significant and dramatic decreases in all incident categories except detoxification transport rates. In particular, ejections decreased by 50% and arrests decreased by 45%; student referrals to the judicial affairs office fell a remarkable 89%. Our review of

effect sizes reveals moderate-to-quite-large effects for each of these incident categories. These low incident rates continued during the following seasons.

We should note that, in addition to the ban, campus and city police instituted fairly aggressive search procedures during the first season to prevent fans from bringing alcohol into the stadium. Police backed off in subsequent seasons because the fans did not respond well to the searches. Low incident rates persisted in the later seasons, even though it is likely that some fans were able to smuggle alcohol into the stadium on game day (see Table 2).

Survey Data

Attitudes Toward the No-Alcohol Policy

Data in Table 3 show means and standard deviations for the alcohol-policy items for each respondent group and for each survey year. A review of the means for season ticket holders for both years showed us that this group was generally neutral-to-positive about the ban (means for the alcohol-policy items ranged from 2.9 to 3.9 on a scale of 1–5). Students, however, reported more negative responses. In 1996, students were significantly less positive than season ticket holders about their satisfaction with the no-alcohol policy, the effects that the policy had on their levels of enjoyment at the games, and their attitudes regarding the policy when they first heard about it and when they completed the survey at the end of the season.

The effect sizes for each of these differences were small. However, we noted a large effect associated with the influence of the policy on crowd behavior, with season ticket holders reporting much more favorable responses. In 1997, season ticket holders and students differed significantly on all

TABLE 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Season Ticket Holders and Students 1996–1997

Variable	Season ticket holders		Students		Over time		1996 Season ticket holders vs students <i>p</i> (ES)	1997 Season ticket holders vs students <i>p</i> (ES)
	1996 (<i>n</i> = 487)	1997 (<i>n</i> = 261)	1996 (<i>n</i> = 115)	1997 (<i>n</i> = 76)	Season ticket holders <i>p</i> (ES)	Students <i>p</i> (ES)		
Satisfaction with								
No alcohol policy								
<i>M</i>	2.9	3.1	2.4	2.1	.100	.137	.002	< .001
<i>SD</i>	1.65	1.55	1.45	1.26			.31	.67
Security at the games								
<i>M</i>	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.5	.068	.440	.564	.014
<i>SD</i>	.82	.71	.81	.73				.28
Crowd behavior								
<i>M</i>	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.3	.001	.008	.881	< .001
<i>SD</i>	.79	.68	.95	1.06	.27	.40		.78
Effect of alcohol policy on								
Crowd behavior								
<i>M</i>	3.6	3.7	2.9	2.7	.292	.292	< .001	< .001
<i>SD</i>	.98	.98	1.05	1.03			.71	1.0
Own enjoyment at games								
<i>M</i>	2.9	3.1	2.5	2.5	.123	.791	.008	< .001
<i>SD</i>	1.40	1.26	1.02	.80			.30	.52
Attitudes toward policy								
When first heard of it								
<i>M</i>	2.9	3.0	2.5	2.4	.192	.982	.010	< .001
<i>SD</i>	1.46	1.36	1.37	1.21			.28	.45
Now								
<i>M</i>	3.0	3.1	2.5	2.5	.295	.620	.002	< .001
<i>SD</i>	1.48	1.38	1.33	1.27			.35	.44

Note: All items measured on a scale from 1 to 5. Satisfaction: *very dissatisfied to very satisfied*; Effect of policy: *substantially worse to substantially better, substantially decreased enjoyment to substantially increased enjoyment*; Attitudes toward policy: *terrible idea to great idea*. Statistically significant differences are in boldface type. ES = effect size, shown only for significant differences.

alcohol-policy items, with students reporting less favorable attitudes. In particular, we found moderate-to-large effects for satisfaction with the policy and with crowd behavior.

Attitudes within the ticket-holder group changed very little across the 2 years. Only one item showed a significant change: the season ticket holders were more positive in 1997 than in 1996 about the effect of the ban on crowd behavior. Student respondents showed the opposite change on this item, reporting more dissatisfaction in the second year than they did in the first year (see Table 3).

Reasons for Not Renewing Season Tickets

On the 1996 questionnaire, nonrenewing season ticket holders selected from a list of nine reasons why they chose not to renew for the upcoming season. Respondents could check more than one reason or write in a reason not on the list. Among the 1996 nonrenewing season ticket holders, the most frequently cited reason for not renewing season tickets was money—73% mentioned ticket prices, the required annual donation, or value for the money as a reason for not renewing. Twenty-nine percent indicated that the new policy governing alcohol consumption was a motive for not renewing their season tickets; 19% men-

tioned fans' misbehavior and drinking or both. When asked for the "one biggest reason" for not renewing season tickets, 52% of the 65 who responded said ticket prices, the annual donation, or value; only 6% said the biggest reason was the change in the alcohol policy.

Only 227 of approximately 11,000 1996 season ticket holders (about 2%) did not renew their tickets for fall 1997, and 81% of the students (excluding seniors) who attended games in fall 1996 said that they would purchase tickets for the fall 1997 season. Among fall 1997 game goers, only 15 (6%) of the 261 season ticket-holder respondents said they would not renew their tickets for the following season; 76% of students surveyed (excluding seniors) said they would purchase tickets again the following season. Analyses of survey responses for both years indicate there was no relationship between attitudes regarding the ban and likelihood of renewing tickets. Thus, the ban seems unlikely to affect ticket sales.

Attitudes by the Ticket-Holder Subgroup

We analyzed survey results for season ticket holders and students to identify any significant subgroup differences, using a 1-to-5 scale with higher scores representing more positive attitudes.

Season Ticket Holders

Season ticket holders' attitudes regarding the alcohol policy did not differ by gender for either year. Speculating that long-term ticket holders might be more bothered by the break with tradition that the ban signaled, we examined item responses by number of years the respondent had held a season ticket. In fact, the opposite seems to have been true. For both 1996 and 1997, longer term (10 or more years) ticket holders were more positive than more recent ticket holders about

- (a) the policy in general
- (b) the effect of the policy on crowd behavior
- (c) enjoyment at the games
- (d) general attitude toward the policy when it was first announced
- (e) general attitude when they completed the survey following the close of the season

Similarly, season ticket holders more than 50 years old tended to be more positive than younger season ticket holders about these same five items.

We also categorized respondents according to whether they were formally affiliated with CU-Boulder (faculty, staff, parent of a student), an alumnus of the school, or had no formal connection to CU-Boulder. In 1996, alumni were consistently less positive about the ban, compared with respondents directly affiliated with the university ($M = 2.7$ vs 3.3 , $p < .05$). This finding confirmed the administration's suspicions that alumni groups would object most strongly to the elimination of alcohol in the stadium. However, this same difference did not emerge among 1997 respondents. Means for alumni were actually higher across all items in 1997 than for alumni responding in 1996.

Students

Analyses of student data by gender, entry term (before or after the ban was in effect), and age revealed only two significant differences. In 1996, women viewed the policy's effect on crowd behavior more favorably than men did ($M = 3.2$ vs 2.6 , $p < .05$). In 1997, students younger than 21 years were more satisfied with security at the games than were students aged 21 years or more ($M = 3.7$ vs 3.2 , $p < .05$).

COMMENT

Changes in game-day security incidents speak to the affect of the new alcohol policy at CU-Boulder. Arrests, assaults, ejections, and student referrals to the judicial affairs office all fell dramatically after the ban on beer sales was enacted and have continued to remain low relative to the preban year. The continued low rate of incidents indicates that the ban has maintained its positive impact over time. This success has been achieved despite that, overall, high-risk (ie, binge) drinking among CU-Boulder students has not fallen during the same time period. Thus, the findings cannot be explained as simply a result of generally lower drinking rates among CU-Boulder students.

Although a sizeable number of season ticket holders and students reported dissatisfaction with the new policy, we have no indication that ending beer sales has influenced ticket renewal rates for either group. Quite the contrary, season ticket renewal rates remain high for CU football games among both season ticket holders and students. Thus, concerns about losing a substantial number of long-time fans as a result of the ban seem unfounded.

Two findings were somewhat unexpected. We were surprised that attitudes about the ban did not change significantly over the 2 years. We expected to obtain more positive attitudes in the 1997 survey than in the 1996 survey, especially among season ticket holders, because season ticket holders in 1997 would be more accustomed to the concept of alcohol-free games. Although means were in the predicted direction (ie, 1997 means were higher than 1996), increases were not significant except for the one item assessing changes in crowd behavior. Interestingly, items assessing crowd behavior showed the largest differences between season ticket holders and students, suggesting that students have a very different view of appropriate game-day behavior in the stadium.

We were also surprised that students who entered the university in fall 1996 and therefore had no prior experience with alcohol sales in the stadium were not more positive about the ban than those who had entered before fall 1996 and had experience attending games when beer was allowed. The beer ban was quite controversial on campus and generated considerable negative press throughout the 1st year. This may have accounted for the lack of more positive attitudes among students more recently admitted to the university.

In addition, all students were aware that the 2 years during which the survey was conducted represented an experiment and that the chancellor would make a final decision about making the ban permanent based in part on the results of the survey after the fall 1997 season. This may have influenced students to provide more negative responses than they would otherwise have expressed in hopes of convincing the campus administration that the beer ban was unpopular and, thus, undesirable.

Limitations

Despite our findings that seem to support the wisdom of eliminating alcohol sales from the stadium, our study is not without some limitations. First, the response rates for the surveys were typically low for a mail survey, especially among students. It is possible that we received responses from the most dissatisfied or impassioned individuals; however, this is unknown. Because of the possible bias in the survey results, we rely more heavily on the objective incident data obtained from the police department in judging the effectiveness of the ban.

The study is also somewhat limited in the availability of preban incident data. The university police department did not begin keeping official statistics on stadium incidents until fall 1995. Therefore we can only compare the postban incident data with data from 1 year before the ban. Our

study would be suspect if the preban data represented an outlier. Informal interviews with campus and city police indicate that this was not the case and that the figures obtained in 1995 were representative of the years when alcohol was served. This is, in fact, what prompted the university to conduct the experiment in the first place. Many officials on campus were concerned with the large number of incidents occurring in the stadium on game days.

Although we heard many anecdotal reports of students and season ticket holders drinking excessively before the games because they could not obtain alcohol once inside the stadium, we could not substantiate these claims. It did not resonate with officials policing the games or with personnel evaluating fans as they entered the stadium. Police and persons working the stadium gates did not report higher incidents of fans being denied admission to the stadium because of obvious intoxication.

In spite of the anecdotes, the incident data tell the story of the outcome of the ban quite convincingly. Even if gamegoers were consuming alcohol before or during the games (ie. sneaking in alcohol), the number of incidents that occurred in the stadium decreased significantly once alcohol sales were prohibited.

The Chancellor's Decision

Despite the overwhelming evidence in support of the beer ban, the chancellor's decision making the ban permanent was not without controversy. Although the chancellor had the support of many groups on campus—campus police, health center, and student affairs personnel—and in the community, including city police, health professionals, counselors, newspaper editors as well as the CU system-wide president, students and alumni were quite vocal in their opposition to the decision.

Surprisingly, members of the CU Board of Regents, the governing board for the university, were another group who initially objected to the continuation of the ban. In a meeting coinciding with the chancellor's announcement, the regents deadlocked on a vote to overrule the chancellor's decision and lift the ban. One regent was quoted as saying "My constituents want to have a beer."¹³ The motion was tabled until a later meeting, at which time it was defeated by a 7–2 margin.

At the same time, a regent's motion to extend the ban to high-priced sky boxes was defeated, also by a 7–2 margin, thus allowing the continuation of alcohol service to so-called *wealthy* patrons. In the end, the decision to exempt sky boxes from the beer ban generated the most negative press. News headlines included "No Beer in Folsom: Unless You've Donated Big Money to CU Athletics"¹⁴ and "Dry Fans Cry Foul: Some Angered by Regents' Decision to Allow Alcohol in Flatirons Club."¹⁵ Currently, the chancellor prohibits alcohol consumption in his box, but there is no move to extend the ban to all sky boxes. The issue is likely to return in the future.

Many researchers have demonstrated how environmental factors such as availability of alcohol increase alcohol con-

sumption and the negative effects of drinking.^{11,12,16} Reports of research in the literature support the notion that reducing access to alcohol leads to decreased consumption and fewer negative consequences. Our data also support this position. The Folsom Field beer ban offers an example of what can be achieved when alcohol is eliminated from an environment that often fosters disorderly and disruptive behavior. The beer ban represents one important step among many that the University of Colorado is pursuing to reduce the negative consequences of excessive alcohol consumption on the Boulder campus.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This work was supported, in part, by a grant to the University of Colorado at Boulder from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (grant # 030197). As part of the grant, the Harvard School of Public Health administered the Wechsler CAS to CU-Boulder students in 1993, 1997, 1998, and 1999. The binge-drinking rate for CU-Boulder students has held steady at about 58% for the years the survey was administered. More detailed data are available from the first author.

NOTES

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